unfriendly demonstrators, but we thought the friendly crowds would [illegible] him to pieces. It was a moving sight to see."

Nonetheless, the events of that week in May 1958 brought home to [illegible] of us the clear truth that, as the Vice President reported at the end of [illegible] trip, "the threat of Communism in Latin America is greater than ever before."

* * *

This threat, though none of us knew it at the time, was to be thrust into the open first, not on the Latin American mainland, but on the island of Cuba. There a bearded young man named Fidel Castro had succeeded in gathering together a band of about a thousand guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains, a force promising to throw out the self-enriching and corrupt dictator Fulgencio Batista and end the suppressions and brutalities of his police state.[8]

Throughout 1958, in accordance with the charter of the OAS, the United States carefully followed a policy of non-intervention in Cuba, although sentimental support for Castro was widespread. We repeatedly seized cargoes of arms headed for Castro and in March suspended the delivery of arms to Batista. We would not take sides or intervene, I told a news conference on November 5, 1958, except to protect American citizens in Cuba.[9] A month later Castro launched a major attack against Santa Clara, the capital of Las Villas province in central Cuba. Batista's local forces, unable to defeat Castro, decided to join him. Obviously Castro had won the emotional, and now the significant material support [illegible] Cuban people.

During the rush of these last events in the final days of 1958, the Central Intelligence Agency suggested for the first time that a Castro victory might not be in the best interests of the United States. (Earlier reports which I had received of Castro's possible Communism were suspect because they originated with people who favored Batista.)

"Communists and other extreme radicals appear to have penetrated the Castro movement," Allen Dulles said. "If Castro takes over, they will probably participate in the government." When I heard this estimate, I was provoked that such a conclusion had not been given earlier.

One of my advisers recommended that the United States should now back Batista as the lesser of two evils. I rejected that course. If Castro turned out to be as bad as our intelligence now suggested, our only hope, if any, lay with some kind of non-dictatorial "third force," neither Castroite nor Batistiano.

On New Year's Day 1959, Batista sought refuge in the Dominican Republic, and Fidel Castro prepared to enter Havana in triumph.

Despite our apprehensions, Castro's first moves in the new year gave some observers cause to hope for the best. On January 2, for example, he proclaimed the appointment of an acceptable Provisional President, Carlos Manuel Urrutia Lleo, who in turn a few days later appointed as Premier the respected Dr. José Miro Cardona.[10] A group of Latin American governments had extended recognition to Castro by January 6.

From the intelligence digest prepared in my office during the early weeks of 1959:

> January 2, 1959: The Fidel Castro rebels are consolidating their control in the country. Santiago has fallen to them. An interesting facet which the State Department considers partly cheerful is the turning over of the armed forces by Cantillo to a Colonel Ramon Barquin, who has aided the rebels in their consolidation. Favorable aspects of the turnover are (1) that Barquin is an apparently well-thought-of officer, and (2) his opportunity to take a hand may strengthen the military's position, vis-à-vis Castro, and add a certain amount of stability to the situation. Castro is short on experienced and responsible personnel. The Communists can be expected to exploit a fast-moving situation, perhaps by supporting a general strike.
>
> January 6, 1959: Provisional President Urrutia established himself in the Presidential Palace in the early evening on January 5 after a delay of several hours caused by a non-Castro rebel group known as the Directorate. The Cabinet announced on January 3, however, contains

[8] Castro's struggle had been going on for years. On the 26th of July 1953, a date which gave his movement its name, he and a little band of followers had unsuccessfully attacked the Moncado Barracks in Santiago de Cuba. After a tempestuous 3½ years of fighting, imprisonment, and exile in Mexico, Castro returned to Cuba, where he hid out in the Sierra Maestra jungles, conducting intermittent guerrilla forays. Herbert L. Matthews of the *New York Times*, having held exclusive talks with Castro in his mountain hideout, proclaimed him "the most remarkable and romantic figure to arise in Cuban history since José Martí, the hero of the Wars of Independence." And in the absence of reports to the contrary, and the universal revulsion against the Batista government, it is not surprising that large numbers of his readers should have echoed Matthews' views.

Castro promised free elections, social reform, schools, housing, and an end to corruption. Though some individuals, in and out of government, voiced suspicions that the Castro movement was Communist-inspired and -supported, these rumblings were drowned out by the chorus of plaudits encouraging the "liberator."

[9] In late July of 1958 Castro's rebel forces in Oriente province threatened the water supply for the United States naval base at Guantanamo Bay, which comes from the Yateras River, across the boundary in Cuba. The United States at once, by agreement with the Cuban government, sent a contingent of Marines into Cuba to protect the Yateras pumping station until government soldiers, temporarily withdrawn, could return to guard it.

[10] Two years later Dr. Miro Cardona headed the Cuban exiles during the weeks of preparation for the invasion at the Bay of Pigs.

does seem somewhat unfair is that members of Congress are practically immune from the microscopic examinations and investigations that are so often the portion of appointed public figures.

Adams' trust in his friend was strong but obviously misplaced. Therefore his failure to check up on the nature of the favors and gifts he received is at least understandable. But no one who really knew him ever questioned the nature of the man who received them or questioned his integrity for a moment. The fate of Governor Adams was determined by several unrelated sets of facts which, when brought together in an atmosphere of hostile suspicion, made any other outcome impossible. Even today, if I were called upon to suggest the names of men for a position of trust—men in whose character I had confidence—I would never hesitate to list Sherman Adams among them.

* * *

The departure of Governor Adams created the need for some reorganization in my personal staff, and I quickly began conferring with some of my associates about a replacement. Among the names suggested were those of military men, known for their capacity for handling staff duties expeditiously.

General Alfred Gruenther, then President of the American National Red Cross, General Lauris Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander of SHAPE, and Vice Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., of the Navy were of this group; so was Brigadier General Andrew Goodpaster. In my opinion each was fully capable, by reason of his knowledge, personality, and character, of handling the responsibilities of the position. Other names brought forward were those of Secretary Seaton of the Interior Department and Ambassador Lodge, still serving in the United Nations. Scarcely any of these men could have been spared from his present post, however.

I became convinced that the man who could most easily be fitted into the position was Governor Adams' outstanding deputy, Major General Wilton B. Persons, long since retired from the Army.

While Jerry Persons' military record was a distinguished one, he had been taken off field duty as early as 1930 and assigned to official duties of a civilian character that had given him extensive background information about the members of Congress and the legislative process. His final five years in this kind of work had been performed in the White House. I had come to respect his abilities, particularly as a coordinator among individuals holding vigorous and differing views. I decided to promote him to the vacant post, and so he became the general supervisor of the entire staff. Though his over-all responsibilities were thus heavier than before, I was able to free him of one particular function. Because of my own intimate participation in the conduct of international affairs, I thought it would needlessly burden the chief of the White House staff to be involved deeply in national security affairs. So I arranged for all Defense and State Department problems coming to the White House to be brought to me directly either by Gordon Gray, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, by the White House Staff Secretary, General Goodpaster[6] or by my son, John, who served as Goodpaster's assistant. Of course Persons could voluntarily attend conferences on these subjects.

Having decided to fill the top post by promotion within the staff, with one or two exceptions I followed the same policy throughout. I promoted Gerald Morgan from the post of Special Counsel to that of Deputy to General Persons. Through six years of service in the White House he had established himself as one of my truly valuable staff officers and one capable, in the absence of his superior, of handling all the responsibilities of the Assistant to the President.

Bryce Harlow was given a new title, "Deputy Assistant to the President for Congressional Affairs," replacing Jerry Persons in that position.

Under Harlow were some very capable and hard-working men. One was Jack Z. Anderson, a former congressman who was very successful in furthering among congressional members a clear understanding of legislation we recommended. Other members were Edward A. McCabe, Earle D. Chesney, and Homer H. Gruenther, all of whom had been with me from

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General Goodpaster continued to carry the title of Secretary of the White House staff, but so far as I was concerned, his most important duty was to handle all correspondence reaching the White House that dealt with national security affairs. As such, his duties overlapped those of Gordon Gray, with Gray's responsibilities covering the long-range planning of the NSC, and Goodpaster's involving day-to-day operations. Immediately under him were several assistants. The first of these, as I have mentioned, was my son, John, who came from the Pentagon to become Goodpaster's assistant specifically assigned to the international field—particularly subjects that came to us directly from the State and Defense Departments, the AEC, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Arthur Minnich was the assistant responsible for general correspondence and activities pertaining to domestic issues. E. Frederic Morrow, a Republican man, and a negro, who had campaigned for the ticket in 1952, served as Administrative Officer for special projects, giving attention also to the field of civil rights.

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Eisenhower "The White House Years — Waging Peace 1956-61"

Index Citations:

✓ Bissell, Rich 545, 546 II-2

✓ CIA several 389, 609, 521, 533, 534, 536, 543

✓ Gray, Gordon several 319, 319n, 320n, 544

+ Goodpaster, Gen. several 37, 65, 73, 91, 225, 228, 245, 255-6, 277, 319, 319n, 406, 407, 566, 632, 609, 543-8

~~Langer, Wm. 380n, 395~~

National Defense several

Satellite program

~~U-2 program several~~

✓ National Security Act 298

✓ National Security Council several, 67 (Hungary), 298 (nature of),

✓ Persons, Gen. W. several

→ ✓ Dulles, Allan several 521 (Castro), 67 (Hungary), 82 (intel review), 270 (Iraq), 298 (Quemoy), 79 (Hungary), 90 (Suez), 198n (Syria)

→ ✓ Cabell, Gen 262, 609 reports to Pres.

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Subject — Eisenhower Period 20's

✓ 20. NSC Briefings

Was there a WH War Room in operation in 50's?

21 Miscellaneous

22 Candidate Briefings

23 Chronology

✓ 24 OCI Publications

25 White House Sit. Room

26 Camp David Sit. Room

27 Berlin

✓ 28 Presidential Trips